V. Carraud, L'Invention du moi - Philosophy, Anthropology and Ideas

French Literature Reviews - 2026

V. Carraud, L'Invention du moi
Philosophy, Anthropology and Ideas

Vincent Carraud, L'Invention du moi

PUF, Chaire Etienne Gilson collection

May 19, 2010, 334 pages

  • ISBN: 978-2-13-057851-2
  • Price: 24 euros

Publisher's overview:

As a prerequisite to any long-term history of the subject, this study begins with a textual fact: the invention of the substantive expression "le moi" (the self) by Pascal, who himself acknowledged the unprecedented Cartesian expression ego ille.
Le moi is not a primary, timeless given, but rather the result of doubt pushed to its ultimate extreme—which is why antiquity and the Middle Ages ignored it. Nor does our inquiry align with traditional studies on commentaries of the De Anima. Furthermore, it must not be confused with research into the origins of subjectivity, because even before being determined as a subject—that is, as a foundation—the self is attained through the operation of what Husserl terms phenomenological reduction.
Thus, the self cannot be identified with the soul, the intellect, consciousness, the individual, the person, or even the self in the sense of the *soi*. It is only by distinguishing it from all these avatars that we can address Husserl's question: "What can be undertaken, from a philosophical perspective, with the ego?"
This book analyzes the conditions that enabled the invention of the self—promptly overshadowed by Leibniz's individual or Locke's *self*—and sheds light on what it inaugurates: for the primary question posed to the self, by Pascal as well as Descartes, is not what it is, but the existential question of who it is.

The Author

Vincent Carraud, a former student of the École normale supérieure, is a professor at the University of Caen, where he heads the Identity and Subjectivity research team. He is the author of Pascal et la philosophie (PUF, 2nd ed. 2007), Causa sive ratio. La raison de la cause, de Suarez à Leibniz (PUF, 2002), and Pascal : des connaissances naturelles à l'étude de l'homme (Vrin, 2007).

Table of Contents

Foreword. — Étienne Gilson, metaphysics, and the history of the self

First Lesson. — The first self: Pascal
§ 1. The odious self
§ 2. What constitutes the self

Second Lesson. — That thinking self
§ 1. The grammar of metaphysics: Descartes
§ 2. The unity of the self: from Fénelon to Rousseau
§ 3. The self in question: Saint Augustine
§ 4. [Translator note: omitted in original text structure numbering]

Third Lesson. — The self and substance: Leibniz
§ 1. This self, which speaks volumes
§ 2. Thinking about what is called the self

Fourth Lesson. — The self without substance: Locke
§ 1. The same self
§ 2. Consciousness and reflection

Fifth Lesson. — The self or the intellect
§ 1. The self of the flying man: Avicenna
§ 2. Socrates' self
§ 3. The self and the chin: Chrysippus
§ 4. The self as one's own: Epictetus
§ 5. The self and being-for-self: Themistius
§ 6. "Dieses Ich" and "ce mien moi": from Meister Eckhart to Bérulle

Sixth Lesson. — Who is the self?
§ 1. Reflection or reduction: Husserl and Descartes
§ 2. The ego without privilege: Heidegger and Descartes
§ 3. Die Wahrheit: from Pascal to Rousseau

Bibliography
Index nominum

The historical development of subjectivity and the self has long occupied scholars working within modern European philosophy and the history of metaphysics. Investigating the emergence of terms like le moi requires tracing how classical, medieval, and early modern thinkers formulated notions of consciousness, the soul, and the individual. Intellectual historians often examine seventeenth-century philosophy to understand shifts in how human identity and the thinking subject are defined, distinguishing these modern developments from ancient and medieval traditions that approached the mind through different conceptual frameworks.

Vincent Carraud's L'Invention du moi examines the textual origins of the expression le moi, analyzing its formulation through the work of Pascal and Descartes. The study distinguishes the self from the soul, the intellect, and consciousness, while addressing philosophical questions concerning the ego. Readers interested in the history of philosophy, early modern metaphysics, and the conceptual evolution of subjectivity may find this work relevant to their pursuits.